Simple substances and a complex world › The Mill and What It Is Meant to Show

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 24, 20253 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 73Simple substances and a complex world › The Mill and What It Is Meant to Show
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In section 17 Leibniz imagines a machine that could think and perceive. Enlarge it until you could walk around inside it as you might walk through a mill. What would you find? He expects that you would find the parts interacting, one piece pressing or turning another. He argues that there would be nothing among those interactions to explain a perception. He therefore places perception in a simple substance. Monadology, §17

The mill is an invitation to compare what a mechanical description explains with what still seems to be missing. A repairer could tell you why a gear is turning. The harder question, for Leibniz, is what makes a state count as a single perception. Someone who thinks experience can arise from an organization of parts can accept everything the visitor finds and deny the inference Leibniz draws from it. Walking through the mill does not by itself show what capacities the whole mechanism can have.

The example is worth rereading with that objection in view. The claim that you cannot point to a perception as an extra component is weaker than the claim that the machine cannot perceive. Leibniz's argument needs the idea that the unity of a perception cannot be accounted for by the way parts are arranged or act on each other. Once that premise is explicit, a reader can ask whether the rest of the argument gives enough reason to accept it. Monadology, §§13–17

The mill also clarifies what Leibniz's project would have to provide beyond an argument against mechanical perception. A simple substance supplies a possible place for the unity he seeks. It still leaves the further question of how one substance can represent an entire scene. His answer appeals to how it expresses the common world, a relationship that depends on the way all of its states agree with those of other substances. Monadology, §§14, 56–61

Consider Leibniz's description of the same town seen from several sides. The view down a street and the view from a hill can have almost nothing in common in what stands out to the viewer. They can still be views of the same town. For Leibniz each monad expresses one universe, but much of what it represents is confused. The thought is about relations among distinct representations. The comparison concerns how each monad represents the world. The hill and the street belong to the example. Monadology, §§3, 56–62

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