Simple substances and a complex world › Sufficient Reason and the Choice of a World

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 24, 20253 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 73Simple substances and a complex world › Sufficient Reason and the Choice of a World
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The sufficient-reason principle is the bridge from the histories of finite beings to Leibniz's account of God's role. For an illustration he takes his own act of writing. It has a long history of bodily movements and dispositions, and there are tendencies in his soul that help explain what he is trying to do. As we study these details, each contingent fact can lead to further contingent facts. Leibniz thinks that even indefinitely many such explanations do not explain why that whole sequence obtains. He locates the ultimate ground in a necessary being, God. Monadology, §§31–39

The move is contentious. A reader might be satisfied if each particular state can be explained by earlier states. Leibniz asks for a different kind of answer. Why do these states and their relations make up the actual sequence of the world? An older item in the sequence would itself belong to what he wants to explain. The argument requires that the sequence as a whole needs a reason and that a reason within the sequence cannot do the job he has in mind. Monadology, §§36–38

There is a second use of sufficient reason when Leibniz says that infinitely many possible universes are present as ideas in God. Only one of them is actual, so there must be a reason to actualize this one in preference to the rest. Leibniz appeals to the degree of perfection of the possible orders. God's wisdom knows which is best, goodness chooses it, and power produces it. He connects order and variety to that perfection by describing the multitude of perspectives on a single universe. Monadology, §§53–59

Readers can distinguish this proposal from the question whether we can compare entire alternative worlds. Leibniz gives a general answer about what God's reasons concern. That does not hand a finite observer a procedure for adding up the imperfections and merits of everything that might have happened. The distinction is especially relevant if we ask how suffering could belong to the best possible order. A person who doubts that premise need not claim that no order of any sort exists. Monadology, §§53–60, 90

It is also worth distinguishing an expression of the world from a report that makes all the facts accessible. A finite monad does not survey all of the alternatives just because it expresses everything that occurs in its own world. In Leibniz's account it grasps distinctly only a relatively small part of what it represents. Judging the world from a particular place is therefore different from the divine comparison on which the argument depends. Monadology, §§53–55, 60–62

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