Simple substances and a complex world › How a Simple Being Can Represent Many Things
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Simple substances and a complex world › How a Simple Being Can Represent Many ThingsSection view · Sections in this chapter4 / 10 ↓
A perception can have a complicated content without itself being an arrangement of physical pieces. Leibniz asks readers to consider the variety in the object of even an ordinary conscious thought. For example, thinking about three music notes together includes several elements in what is being thought about. That does not show that Leibniz is right about the simplicity of a soul. It clarifies what someone who accepts that simplicity needs to account for. A unity can have a state with varied content. Monadology, §§13–16
Leibniz treats perception as broader than conscious awareness. A monad can represent something without clearly distinguishing what it represents. A reader who equates perception with attention would lose the contrast that he uses to describe the range of monads. Monadology, §§14, 19–24, 60
The activity of the internal principle that brings about a passage from one perception to another. The term extends beyond deliberate desire. It belongs to Leibniz's account of change even where there is no conscious consideration of a goal. Monadology, §§14–15
Leibniz's principle says that a true statement or fact has a sufficient reason why it is so rather than otherwise, although we are often unable to know that reason. A reason for a contingent fact does not make the fact necessary. The opposite of a contingent truth is possible. Monadology, §§31–38
Soul and body proceed according to their own laws and agree with each other. The harmony is between substances that represent one and the same universe. Agreement does not require one created monad to produce an internal alteration in another. Monadology, §§51, 56–57, 78–81
Leibniz distinguishes monads by how they represent the world. Lacking size and figure, they cannot differ by how much room they occupy. He instead denies that any two monads are intrinsically indistinguishable and describes their perceptions as having different degrees of distinctness. These differences give him a way to think about individuality without reaching for the dimensions or textures by which we ordinarily distinguish objects. Monadology, §§8–9, 56–60
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