Simple substances and a complex world › Is Causal Talk Still Useful?

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 24, 20252 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 73Simple substances and a complex world › Is Causal Talk Still Useful?
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Someone might object that agreement merely gives another name to the problem. Why do the histories line up at all? Leibniz's own answer needs more than the nature of each substance taken by itself. He says that God regulates the whole and in doing so has regard to each substance. The independent unfolding of each finite monad therefore does not explain why any arbitrary collection of such histories would fit together. The history of each belongs to one order of things. Monadology, §§51–56, 59–60

Another objection is that the harmony seems to leave us unable to explain why one event follows from another. Leibniz distinguishes physical influence on the inner being of a created monad from several things we can still explain. He recognizes physical processes between bodies and uses the language of efficient causes for their motions. He also says there is a qualified sense in which one monad acts in relation to another. What is distinctly expressed in one can give a reason for what is less distinctly expressed in the other. He calls the influence ideal in section 51. Monadology, §§49–52, 61, 78–81

This response leaves a disagreement open. We may accept that physical explanations are useful while asking whether the relations Leibniz assigns to bodies and monads are enough to make such explanations true. If we were investigating why a cup broke, the physical interactions of the arm, the cup, and the floor would still matter. The metaphysical question is whether that explanation ultimately requires a substance to change the inner state of another. Leibniz's answer changes which sort of dependence we should take to be fundamental. Monadology, §§51, 61, 79–81

The different kinds of causation also help explain why the two descriptions can be read together without being substituted for each other. Asking why a person reached for the cup is a reasonable way to find out whether they were thirsty or trying to clear the table. Asking what accelerated the cup toward the floor is a different question. The success of one explanation does not make the other question meaningless. Leibniz asks us to understand why the answers belong to a single order. Monadology, §§78–81

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