Intentionality and the objects of thought › The Problem of Psychologism

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20262 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 89Intentionality and the objects of thought › The Problem of Psychologism
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Husserl discusses several versions of psychologism. A common idea is that the rules by which we ought to judge or infer have their theoretical basis in a science of mental processes. This is more than the uncontroversial claim that actually carrying out a proof requires a person capable of following it. The issue is whether the nature and validity of the rules can ultimately be explained by facts about mental life. Prolegomena, §§17–20

Consider the rule usually called modus ponens. If the lock has turned, the bolt has moved. The lock has turned. The conclusion is that the bolt has moved. The rule concerns what follows from those premises, whether or not they happen to be true of this lock. One could replace each proposition with a quite different one and keep the same inferential form. A survey could tell you how often readers draw the conclusion or where they usually go wrong. The validity of the step applies even in a case in which all the readers miss it. Husserl uses this form of inference to ask where, in what the rule says, the existence of any act of judgment is asserted. Prolegomena, §§21–23

Psychologism

In the debate of the Prolegomena, psychologism grounds logic in psychology. Husserl distinguishes the causal question of how people arrive at judgments from the logical question of whether what they infer follows. Prolegomena, §§17–24

There is also a distinction between instruction in reasoning and pure logic. A teacher might tell a student to write the premises on separate lines. A class might genuinely make fewer errors if its students use that method, and observations about attention and memory might explain the improvement. A logical law has a different bearing on the exercise. It establishes what has to be true of a step for it to count as a valid inference. It can guide reasoning because it establishes a relation that holds among the propositions in the first place. This is why Husserl asks which theoretical truths underlie the practical uses of logic. Prolegomena, §§14–20, 21–23

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