Intentionality and the objects of thought › What Makes an Experience Intentional?
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Intentionality and the objects of thought › What Makes an Experience Intentional?Section view · Sections in this chapter5 / 8 ↓
The Fifth Investigation turns to different ways of being directed toward something. Imagine hearing that a train has left. You can accept it, doubt it, or hope that it is true. While the topic is the same, each is a different kind of act. Husserl calls this feature the quality of the act. The matter specifies what is meant and how it is meant. Judging that the train has left and judging that it is still at the platform share a quality but differ in matter. These are distinctions within the experiences. The two judgments concern the same train, while what each claims about the train differs. Investigation V, §§16–21
The language of being directed toward an object can mislead. If you imagine a unicorn, it makes sense to ask what you are imagining whether or not there are any unicorns. Introducing a second unicorn that exists as an object inside the act would confuse what you are imagining with what belongs to your experience of imagining it. Husserl also distinguishes acts from features of experience that are not themselves object-directed. A sensory feature can enter into hearing a train without being the object you are attending to when you hear the train. Investigation V, §§9–11, 14–17
Intentionality is the directedness of an act such as perceiving, doubting, or remembering. An analysis can ask what the act is directed toward, how it presents that object, and which kind of act it is. A remembered tune and a tune you currently hear give you different ways of attending to what may be the same tune. Investigation V, §§9–11, 16–21
The middle investigations make related distinctions on the side of what is meant. The Second asks how a universal can be intended when the example before you is individual. The Third studies relations of whole and part, including the difference between parts that can exist independently and dependent features. The Fourth asks what lets meanings combine. Consider the difference between a door that is at once open and closed in the same respect, and a string like door and if the. There is enough of a claim in the first to see the incompatibility. In the second, the words supply no such complete claim. Both can be called nonsense in ordinary speech. The distinction gives Husserl a reason to study the ways meanings can combine before judging whether a combination can be true. Investigation II, §§1–5, III, §§1–5, and IV, §§10–14
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