Intentionality and the objects of thought › What It Is to See for Yourself

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20263 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 89Intentionality and the objects of thought › What It Is to See for Yourself
Reading section 6 of 8 · What It Is to See for Yourself · 3 minSection 6 of 8 · 3 min

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Intentionality and the objects of thought › What It Is to See for YourselfSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 8 ↓

Husserl uses the term fulfillment when what an expression had merely meant is given in a corresponding intuition. Someone tells you about a red patch on a poster in another room. Before walking through the door, you can understand what they meant. After you see the poster, you can take the red patch that you now see as the very one referred to. The two acts have come into a relation of identification. Merely seeing something else red on the way would fail to bring about this relation, and the patch you turn out to see could be the right patch but the wrong color. In the latter case the initial intention meets something that conflicts with it. Investigation VI, §§6–11

The difference between fulfilling an intention and having a feeling of certainty matters. The report may have sounded so convincing that you felt certain even before leaving the room. Seeing the patch supplies something of a different kind. Husserl also distinguishes degrees of fulfillment. You can make out the color from the doorway while its precise shape remains hard to see. If the claim involves the border of the patch as well as its color, a closer look could give it a kind of support that your first glimpse could not. Investigation VI, §§16–20, 36–39

The sixth investigation also contains Husserl's account of categorial intuition. He asks how we can see that a sheet of paper is white. There is the perceived paper and its color, but no additional visible patch corresponding to the word is. Still, a person looking at the sheet can come to see that the claim is true. Husserl describes a further act, founded on the simpler perceptions, through which the state of affairs is given. That act depends on what the senses supply, while making explicit something that cannot be matched to an extra sensation alongside the rest. Investigation VI, §§40–46

Husserl's example also explains why attending to one's own act of judgment would lead to a different result. A person could shift attention from the paper to the experience of judging and notice a moment of hesitation. That might tell them something about how they reached the judgment that the paper is white. The moment of hesitation belongs to their experience. The paper's being white is what they take themselves to have seen, and they could recognize the same fact on a later occasion without hesitating at all. Husserl makes this distinction when he asks where concepts such as being and state of affairs get their content. Investigation VI, §44

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