Individuals and a rational order › Certainty and Necessity

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 18, 20252 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 72Individuals and a rational order › Certainty and Necessity
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Leibniz considers a difficulty with the complete-concept thesis in section 13. A geometer can derive properties of a circle from its definition. If the crossing can also be derived from Caesar's complete concept, one might conclude that the crossing is necessary in just the same sense. Leibniz thinks the examples differ in the kind of grounds on which the conclusion rests. A geometrical demonstration has grounds that do not depend on God's freely establishing a particular order of things. Caesar's career, however intelligible it is, belongs to such an order. Discourse, §13

Necessity on a supposition

In section 13 Leibniz distinguishes absolute necessity, where the contrary is contradictory, from a connection that is necessary only on a supposition. Given the full order of things God chose and the individual concept belonging to it, Caesar's career is assured. Leibniz takes the contrary outcome to be possible considered in itself. The supposition does essential work in the inference. Discourse, §13

An ordinary example helps isolate the distinction. Suppose a description of a meeting includes that everyone arrived before noon. Holding the complete description fixed, one cannot change someone's arrival to one in the afternoon. That says little about whether the person was physically free to take a later train. Leibniz makes a further claim that the actual course of events has reasons that an adequate concept would express. The meeting example shows only how a claim can follow given a description without following from logic alone. It does not provide a theory of how complete concepts are possible.

The source illustrates this with Caesar's dictatorship and makes explicit reference to his decision to cross the Rubicon. A complete proof of why that undertaking succeeded would show, Leibniz says, why crossing was the option Caesar chose and why he won rather than lost at Pharsalus. It would not show that an army stopping at a river makes no sense. Nor can we settle the separate question of whether a differently situated individual is that same Caesar by saying that God could choose a different world. A complete concept, as Leibniz understands it, is individuating, and we cannot change an event in it while holding the whole concept fixed. Discourse, §§8, 13

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