Individuals and a rational order › The Choice in Caesar's Concept

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 18, 20251 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 72Individuals and a rational order › The Choice in Caesar's Concept
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Suppose you knew enough about Caesar to explain why he crossed the Rubicon. Would having that explanation show that he had to cross? Leibniz thinks it would show something narrower. A complete explanation would show why Caesar crossed in the circumstances in which he acted. It would not make stopping as contradictory as a square with three sides. The trouble is that Leibniz asks us to accept something stronger than the possibility of an explanation. In his account, Caesar's complete concept already includes the crossing. How can an act belong to a person's very concept and still count as a choice?

The Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) brings that question together with two others. What distinguishes an individual substance from a collection of properties? And why would a perfect God choose to create this order of things? Treating the questions separately makes it easier to follow Leibniz's answer. The concept of a substance describes the whole course of its life. God's choice concerns which possible course of the world becomes actual. The creature, in turn, acts from its own reasons within that world. Discourse, §§8–9, 13

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