Individuals and a rational order › What Makes Something a Substance?
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Individuals and a rational order › What Makes Something a Substance?Section view · Sections in this chapter2 / 9 ↓
Calling a thing a substance can begin as a point about grammar. We say that Alexander is a king, but we do not ordinarily predicate Alexander of something else in the way we predicate kingship of him. For Leibniz, this is a clue. It leaves the real question unanswered. What is it about Alexander that makes the statement true? And what would distinguish him from another king who shared some of his qualities? Leibniz asks what a description would have to contain to give an account of this individual rather than just a description that he happens to satisfy. Discourse, §8
A related problem concerns bodies. Size, figure, and motion describe a body, but Leibniz doubts that these properties alone exhaust the nature of a body. He revives the idea of substantial form for this metaphysical problem while rejecting its use as a substitute for studying how things work. Calling something a clock because it has the form of a clock would not tell a repairer how its parts move. The repairer needs the latter explanation even if the philosopher has a further question about what makes a thing one individual rather than an aggregate. Discourse, §§10–12
For Leibniz, the distinguishing feature of an individual substance is that its concept is complete enough to give the grounds of all the predicates truly attributable to it. A finite substance has an intelligible course of its own and still depends on God for its existence and preservation. Self-contained expression and independence of the creator are different claims. Discourse, §§8, 14
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