Individuals and a rational order › Correspondence Without Direct Influence

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 18, 20252 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 72Individuals and a rational order › Correspondence Without Direct Influence
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The complete concept also helps explain how substances can keep their own histories while belonging to the same world. In section 14 Leibniz says that substances depend continually on God and that their appearances correspond without any direct action one on another. He gives an example of people who plan to meet. Each can travel separately by following the agreed arrangement. If they all do so, their different routes bring them to the agreed place. The analogy illustrates agreement among separate courses of events. Unlike the travelers, the substances in his account do not negotiate the arrangement in advance. Discourse, §14

This has special force for the relation between mind and body. If you step onto a beach, you may hear the sea without noticing the sound of any one wave. Leibniz uses the sound of the sea to illustrate how a recognizable sensation can include a great many contributions that the hearer cannot distinguish. The soul expresses what happens to its own body more distinctly than it expresses much of the rest of the world. Yet the soul's perceptions arise from its own nature and correspond to what occurs in its associated body. The correspondence is his explanation of their union. An extraordinary intervention on each occasion of seeing or hearing would put off the question of why these events ordinarily agree. Discourse, §§32–33

The account sounds as if it has no room for talk of one thing acting upon another. Section 15 explains why we can still speak that way. In a change that involves two substances, Leibniz identifies activity with an increase in the first substance’s degree of expression and passivity with a corresponding decrease for the second. His explanation of ordinary language therefore depends on which substance better expresses or accounts for the change. What it does not involve is a feature moving across from one substance to make another one act. Calling all causal talk strictly false would miss that distinction. It would also miss the value Leibniz places on mechanical explanations in physics. Discourse, §§10, 14–15, 32

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