Individuals and a rational order › Objections About Freedom and Evil

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 18, 20252 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
Reading tools Notes & comments
Notes & comments
Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 72Individuals and a rational order › Objections About Freedom and Evil
Reading section 6 of 9 · Objections About Freedom and Evil · 2 minSection 6 of 9 · 2 min

Section 6 of 9 · 2 min read

Individuals and a rational order › Objections About Freedom and EvilSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 9 ↓

An objection to the complete-concept thesis can survive the distinction between certainty and absolute necessity. Imagine granting that a different course of events contains no contradiction. A critic can still ask whether that possibility belongs to the very agent in the actual circumstances. The critic might accept that Caesar reasons, plans, and acts for what he takes to be good, while still asking whether this is enough for responsibility. Leibniz sees reasons as inclining an agent without making the opposite action contradictory. In the case of a rational creature, he also describes reflecting before acting and suspending judgment where appropriate. These are the faculties through which the decision takes place. The further philosophical issue is whether exercising these faculties is sufficient for freedom once the entire actual sequence is assured. Discourse, §§13, 30

A second difficulty is how evil enters an order chosen by a perfect creator. In section 7 Leibniz distinguishes what God desires or commands from the evil he permits, and in section 30 he takes up the example of Judas. Leibniz treats the betrayal as Judas's own act and asks why God admits to existence this possible person and the sequence of events containing the act. He appeals to the goodness of that sequence as a whole, while acknowledging that we cannot give a detailed account of why it is better. This moves the discussion from what made Judas act to what justified the choice to create this order of things. It does not settle whether such a distinction would be enough to answer a critic of divine responsibility. Discourse, §§7, 30

Suppose someone argues that a good result could come from a bad decision. This is consistent with thinking the decision itself wrong. It is also a much weaker claim than Leibniz needs. To justify the creation as a whole, he has to claim that the good of the selected order warrants permitting its evils in comparison with the alternatives. The fact that a later good follows an evil event does not on its own establish that no better alternative exists. A reader can accept this form of Leibniz's distinction and still find the largest step in his defense unconvincing.

Comments

Add to the conversation

A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.

No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!

Newsletter

Stay up to date

Get new articles, book updates, and notes on AI and technology.

Unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy