The limits of formal proof › Expressing the Theory's Consistency

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated May 25, 20262 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 96The limits of formal proof › Expressing the Theory's Consistency
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The second result, Proposition XI in §4, uses the fact that proof has been arithmetized. In a familiar modern presentation, write Con(T) for the arithmetical sentence saying there is no code of a T-proof of a fixed contradiction such as 0 = 1. By the rules of the classical theory and the arithmetic it includes, such a derivation would undermine its consistency. Con(T) is thus a concrete sentence about numbers through which the theory can express its own consistency.

The external argument for nonprovability gives a route to the second theorem. In suitable systems, enough of the reasoning can be carried out within the theory to prove that Con(T) implies G. Now suppose the theory proved Con(T). It could combine the consistency statement with that implication and prove G. The first part of the previous argument shows that this is impossible if the theory is consistent. For this inference it is enough to use the part excluding a proof of G, so the result does not need the original ω-consistency assumption simply carried over from the full first theorem.

The phrase “enough of the reasoning” names an important requirement. The formula for provability has to behave correctly inside the theory, for example when proofs are combined along its inference rules. Gödel proves a corresponding internal implication for his own definitions. Modern presentations often spell out derivability conditions that support the argument. Simply writing a sentence labeled “this system is consistent” does not make it the consistency formula involved in the theorem.

The result puts a condition on attempts to certify a theory from within itself. It leaves room for proofs of consistency from different assumptions, in a stronger or otherwise appropriate theory. In such a proof one can ask what warrants the stronger assumptions. The second theorem applies again when deliberation turns to the stronger theory's own consistency, provided it meets the requisite conditions.

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