The limits of formal proof › Seeing the Boundaries of the Result
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The completeness theorem for first-order logic concerns a different use of the word complete. If a sentence follows from premises in every interpretation satisfying them, the logical calculus can derive it from those premises. An arithmetic theory can still be incomplete because its axioms do not determine each sentence across all such interpretations. A sentence recognized as true in the standard natural numbers may fail in another model of the same arithmetic theory. Keeping the class of models in view makes room for both the completeness of the logic and incompleteness of an arithmetic theory formulated with it.
The two results also enter foundational debates in different ways. The first tells us why an effective and sufficiently expressive derivation system can leave questions unanswered. The second challenges a proposal that such rules could certify their own reliability by deriving their own ordinary consistency statement. Questions about which mathematical objects there are, or whether every piece of human reasoning can be modeled by a given procedure, require premises beyond these theorems. The mathematical work here is to specify an obstacle precisely enough that one can tell when it applies.
A good way to follow that work is to keep three statements separate. There is the sentence inside the theory. There is the assertion that a particular numerical code passes the test for being its proof. There is also the argument we make about whether any such proof exists. Gödel's construction makes these statements interact. Its strength comes from making that interaction explicit through arithmetic.
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