Computation and understanding › Objections and Responses

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated June 9, 20264 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 84Computation and understanding › Objections and Responses
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Searle considers six replies in the 1980 paper. The first four ask readers to change what is operating, how it encounters the world, how it works internally, or some combination of those features. Read them as proposals for what a satisfactory theory of understanding would have to explain. Searle’s judgments in the revised cases are arguments for his conclusion, each of which a critic can examine.

The systems reply assigns Chinese understanding to the whole system of person, rules, data, and calculations. Searle asks us to imagine the person memorizing the rules and data, doing the calculations mentally, and walking out of the room. The person would still know only English, he says. The critic can reply that internalizing the process does not erase an organized subsystem or make the person’s ordinary linguistic abilities the measure of what that subsystem can do. In his published commentary, Daniel Dennett objects that this confuses levels of attribution. A person can understand a language without any individual part of the person’s brain understanding it. Searle, pp. 419–420, and Dennett’s commentary, pp. 428–429.

The robot reply adds cameras, movement, and a working connection to the surroundings. A robot can receive signals from actual objects and alter what happens around it. Searle replies by making the person in the room responsible for transforming the incoming signs into output instructions, unaware which signs correspond to cameras or which instructions guide the motors. On his reading, the world has entered the story without entering the operator’s grasp. The reply’s defender can ask whether the robot’s wider history of seeing, acting, and receiving feedback matters to understanding even if the operator does not know any of that history. Searle, p. 420.

The brain simulator reply proposes modeling the sequence of neural firings of a fluent speaker. Searle imagines a system of water pipes and valves. The valves change state in a pattern that mirrors the neural events, and the operator receives and returns the same sort of papers as before. Searle takes the plumbing system to reproduce the formal pattern without duplicating the brain’s relevant capacities. A critic can ask at what level the relevant causal powers are described. If a particular organization of interacting processes is what matters, specifying how the valves interact could matter more than knowing what they are made of. Searle, p. 421.

The combination reply gives the brain simulator a body and integrates it into a robot behaving as a person does. Searle grants that under ordinary conditions we would reasonably ascribe intentionality to such a creature. He argues that the ascription loses its basis if we discover a room producing its movements by the steps he describes. The grounding of that ascription is precisely what the critic can contest. A description of the room’s operations from the operator’s perspective and a causal account of the integrated creature would answer different questions. Searle, p. 421.

The other minds reply asks what justifies treating human linguistic behavior as evidence of understanding while refusing to extend the inference to a machine with the same abilities. Searle says the relevant question is what it takes to have intentionality in the first place. We use behavior to find out whether a person can follow a story, but putting behavior to work as evidence does not mean the behavior constitutes understanding. This reply is close to the practical problem of how we would investigate the question from outside the room. Searle, pp. 421–422.

Searle calls the sixth objection the “many mansions” reply. It points to the possibility of future artificial systems with different principles of operation. He allows that possibility and returns to the narrower claim he set out to dispute. A system might acquire the causal powers responsible for intentionality. If it does, the fact that it also implements a formal program would leave open which features enable it to understand. Searle, pp. 421–422.

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