Computation and understanding › The Core Thesis

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated June 9, 20261 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 84Computation and understanding › The Core Thesis
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A program specifies how to recognize inputs and transform them into further states. Those instructions can be formulated in terms of formal features, such as character shapes in the room. A speaker’s understanding also involves the content of what is said, such as whether a sentence describes a person leaving a restaurant or entering it. Searle grants all the skill needed to manipulate the characters. He argues that the formal transitions by themselves do not account for how the system understands what the characters express.

For Searle the brain’s physical activity has the causal powers needed to produce intentional states. A program can describe an aspect of that activity. Describing an aspect leaves open whether the physical system realizing that description has the powers that matter. Searle treats the prospect of duplicating those powers with different materials as an empirical possibility. His claim is that executing the program gives us no guarantee that the powers have been duplicated. Searle, pp. 422–424.

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