Making inference explicit › A New Language for Thought
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In §3, Frege compares two ways of saying that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea. One grammatical construction makes the Greeks the subject. A passive construction makes the Persians the subject. In the respects that matter to the inferences he is recording, the two sentences can be used in the same way. This is part of what Frege calls their conceptual content. Word order and voice can guide a reader's attention while leaving that content intact.
In §§9–10, Frege explains how to analyze a content by holding one part fixed and allowing another to vary. His example is that hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide. We can hold fixed the comparison “is lighter than carbon dioxide” and ask which gases satisfy it. We can also hold fixed “is heavier than hydrogen” and vary the gas in that comparison. Either way, the starting claim is the same. The decomposition changes according to which term we treat as replaceable. Frege calls the remaining part a function and what occupies the replaceable place an argument.
Write the comparison in modern shorthand as L(hydrogen, carbon dioxide), where L(x, y) means “x is lighter than y.” Holding the second place fixed lets us compare something else against carbon dioxide. Holding the first place fixed lets us compare hydrogen against something else. The order of the places matters. L(y, x) makes a different claim from L(x, y). Frege explicitly discusses that distinction for two-argument functions in §10.
This way of taking a statement apart connects mathematical operations with logical analysis. Frege can isolate what stays the same when we replace a particular word, and he can repeat that operation for different parts of a statement. His later account of a concept as a function whose values are truth-values gives a sharper ontology to the notion. In 1879 his explanation starts from an expression and the different ways we can consider part of it replaceable. The flexibility of the analysis is already doing substantial work.
In §11, Frege introduces an explicit sign for generality. A letter appears inside a concavity in the horizontal line of the formula. Its reach is governed by the portion of the expression the sign applies to. §12 uses generality together with negation to express existence. We would now write “there exists an x that satisfies P” as ∃x P(x). Frege can express it by denying that every x fails to satisfy P. His primitive sign is for universality, and the two quantifier symbols used today were absent from his pages.
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