Making inference explicit › What “Every Student” Leaves Open

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated May 11, 20262 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 93Making inference explicit › What “Every Student” Leaves Open
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Imagine trying to express a simple thought. Every student admires some teacher. Anna may admire Dr. Chen, Ben may admire Dr. Okafor, and the statement can be true even if no teacher is admired by both. Compare it with the claim that there is a teacher whom every student admires. This also talks about all the students and the existence of a teacher. It would be false of Anna and Ben if the only teachers they admire are different people. Making that difference explicit is a useful way into Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift.

Traditional syllogistic could handle inferences that turn on the overlap between categories. If all oak trees are plants and all plants need water, then all oak trees need water. Its familiar forms can also accommodate “all students admire a teacher” if “admires a teacher” is taken as a single predicate. The trouble begins when we want the inference to depend on relationships within that predicate, such as whether different students admire the same teacher. The structure we need to see is inside a unit that the syllogism treats as given.

In the preface of his 1879 book, Frege explains his aim through the question of how much arithmetic could be derived by reasoning alone. He wanted a chain of inference with no gap through which an unacknowledged assumption might enter. Ordinary language proved an obstacle to that aim, since its sentences do not consistently show the inferential relationships he needed to record. The title describes the proposed remedy as a formula language of pure thought modeled on the formula language of arithmetic.

Frege likens his notation to a microscope alongside the eye. A scientific instrument can give a precise view of a narrow range of things. The eye remains better suited to a great many ordinary purposes. In the same way, the concept-script is worth judging by what it reveals about chains of reasoning. Asking it to preserve every distinction we make when we speak would give it a different job from the one Frege designed it to do.

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