Art and its historical forms › Art's highest vocation and the modern viewer
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Art and its historical forms › Art's highest vocation and the modern viewerSection view · Sections in this chapter5 / 5 ↓
In the introduction Hegel writes, in Knox’s translation, that “art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past.” What is in the past is a particular standing for art. Earlier in the introduction that standing is art’s ability to give the deepest interests of a people a sensuous presence in which its highest concern can be satisfied. The words “for us” identify the historically situated audience of the lectures. Hegel says that viewers now judge the content and the mode of presentation, together with how well the two fit. Reflection about works takes on a greater role. The altered standing of art is the reason given for a greater need for philosophy of art. Introduction, §2.
A sculpture displayed in a museum makes the difference imaginable. Suppose a group looks closely at the figure, studies how it was carved, and asks how its placement once worked within a temple precinct. Its lines and proportions may become more absorbing through this knowledge. Yet that activity differs from participating in a practice for which the represented god and the space of worship have present authority. The first group’s time with the sculpture can be rich and rewarding. It illustrates the possibility that a work matters in a different way once the relation between the visible object and its community changes. The museum is an illustration of the argument about standing, and a viewer can have both reflective and immediate experiences of a work.
There is also a question about the breadth of the modern claim. An audience can still find a work indispensable to how it comes to understand a shared event. How would we know whether that is an instance of art resuming the high role Hegel describes? The viewer’s report of being deeply affected would tell us something. We would still need evidence about the work’s place in shared practices and what those practices demand of it. Hegel’s own scale of judgment is larger than an individual experience. His account therefore gives a reason to investigate the role a work occupies even when the work itself seems powerful enough to settle the matter.
These questions return us to his distinction between content and its perceptible presentation. A pyramid can preserve and enclose, a statue can give individuality a bodily presence, and a painting can make an inward concern visible without exhausting it. A viewer who grasps those differences has already begun to ask Hegel’s historical question. What is a community asking this thing to show, and what makes this material, in this setting, capable of showing it?
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