Perception through a lived body › The Work of Description
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The preface to the French text sets up a method for examining this kind of experience. Merleau-Ponty wants to attend to how things are encountered before theoretical explanations take over. That does not make the first answer someone gives about an experience infallible. Familiarity itself can keep the structure of an experience out of sight. You may need to suspend a familiar assumption to see what it has allowed you to take for granted.
One difficulty is that this suspension can never become complete. The person reflecting on perception is already perceiving and living in a world. Merleau-Ponty states this as a lesson of phenomenological reduction, in his discussion of Husserl in the preface. What gets set aside is the unexamined familiarity with which we start, not our entire situation. For example, you can ask what it is to see part of a cup as hidden without trying to think of the cup outside all possible perspectives. The possibility of seeing it from a perspective is part of what the question concerns.
The method does not settle what sensory systems do at the physiological level. It asks a distinct question about what their activity makes available to a perceiver. A physical model can be useful precisely because there is something in experience for it to account for. Merleau-Ponty's criticism is that substituting the theoretical account for perception at the start makes it hard to recognize the phenomenon to be explained.
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