Perception through a lived body › What Schneider's Case Puts in View
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In the same chapter, Merleau-Ponty considers the case reported by Adhémar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein of a patient known as Schneider. Some familiar movements remained available to him. An abstract request to indicate a location on his body could be difficult, even where he could reach toward a concrete stimulus such as a mosquito bite. The difference matters because simple praise of preserved strength or range of movement does not tell us why the two tasks could come apart in the reported case. See the account of concrete movement and the clinical examples in part I, chapter 3.
A command can be understood verbally and still fail to elicit a movement directly. On Merleau-Ponty's account, a concrete action can be organized by a situation that is already present, while abstract movement requires the subject to open up a possible situation around a request. A person trying to make the requested gesture might have to use actual preliminary movements to find an orientation that is usually available straight away. The case makes the difference between what an instruction means and what it calls forth from a body appreciable.
Near the end of the discussion, Merleau-Ponty uses the term intentional arc for the way a person's capacities, past, future and surroundings belong to a connected situation. The term helps explain why he does not treat a difficulty as an isolated malfunction in a list of independent abilities. The case is part of a philosophical argument based on clinical reports available to him. The contrast between tasks can sharpen the question about action without by itself deciding the underlying cause of the disorders. It also does not establish that every patient with difficulty performing abstract movement would have the same preserved abilities.
This is the setting for Merleau-Ponty's distinction between an “I think” and an “I can”. The latter does not mean giving yourself permission or saying in advance that you can do something. It concerns the way a meaningful movement can already be available when your body has a grip on the situation. Compare hearing the sentence “support the board from underneath” with finding the actual stance that lets you carry it with someone else. The sentence can specify a task without settling the bodily orientation through which you undertake it. That gap gives the “I can” some content. It also leaves a role for reflection and instruction, especially when a movement that seems possible from where you stand proves awkward once the weight shifts.
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