Testing and falsification › Changing a Theory After a Failure

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated June 2, 20253 min read
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Part 9 of 12Science and Explanation
Chapter 111Testing and falsification › Changing a Theory After a Failure
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An experiment usually draws on more than one claim. The stated law about the valves leads to a prediction together with assumptions about the equipment and this particular specimen. A failed prediction challenges those claims taken together. You can ask which one should be reconsidered. Redoing the measurements after replacing an incorrectly calibrated gauge can be a step forward. Declaring that a valve stays within the law because any specimen that fails is by definition of a different design would defeat the test unless there were an independently checkable way to identify that difference. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §§19–20

Popper calls attention to ways a theory can be protected by changes that prevent a possible failure from ever counting. His rule for auxiliary hypotheses that change the theoretical system asks them to increase testability. A revised account could predict that failures occur only after a specified contaminant has entered the valve, for example. Tests could check for contamination, deliberately introduce it, and see whether valves fail in the location and manner the revision predicts. If no possible finding about contamination could count against the revision, the adjustment would perform a very different role. The comparison shows why changing an assumption in response to a failed prediction is insufficient by itself to tell us whether a theory has been protected from test. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §§19–20

Even an initially reasonable adjustment can lose its force. The effect could remain when a second measurement shows the pressure to be correct and when inspection excludes the proposed contaminant. At that point investigators have learned something about how the original law and the proposed explanations fall short. They would need to formulate a new proposal or specify a narrower domain in which the original claim can still be defended. Stating that domain clearly can make the remaining commitments easier to check. What matters to Popper is whether the next proposal makes claims whose failure can be recognized. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §§19–22

There is also a difference between revising a general law and checking whether the setup used in one run matches its description. A record that the gauge was defective on Tuesday can be a testable singular claim. It need not serve as a new law about the conditions under which every valve will operate. Popper qualifies his treatment of auxiliary hypotheses to leave room for such cases. Taking that qualification seriously lets the investigator test an explanation of one run while keeping sight of the broader claim that prompted the experiment. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §20

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