Testing and falsification › Falsifiability and the Scope of the Theory
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Testing and falsification › Falsifiability and the Scope of the TheorySection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 7 ↓
Popper proposes falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation for empirical science. A theory is falsifiable if it rules out some possible basic statements, which can figure as premises in an empirical test. The potential falsifying result need never occur. What matters for the criterion is that the theory has consequences specific enough for such a result to conflict with it. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §§4, 6, 21
Falsifiability asks whether a theory excludes some testable outcomes. Falsification asks whether a result warrants taking a particular theory to have failed. On Popper's account, the latter involves accepting conflicting basic statements and establishing a reproducible effect. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §§21–22, teaching excerpt
The same observations can bear differently on claims with different scopes. A valve that opens at 60 units of pressure is compatible with a rule that valves of the design open by 100. It is also compatible with a rule that they open by 75. A valve that opens at 90 distinguishes those rules. If everything else is held fixed, the more precise requirement to open by 75 excludes some possibilities left open by the other. It exposes the claim to tests that the less demanding requirement can survive. Popper gives such comparisons an explicit place in his account of degrees of testability. The comparison here depends on keeping the class of valves and the rest of the test conditions the same. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §§31–36
For Popper this requirement marks out what a claim has to do to enter a particular kind of inquiry. It does not measure the importance of the question the claim concerns. A proposal can guide people toward a new investigation before they develop a way to test it. A scientist might take guidance from a general picture about how nature hangs together, while the claims drawn from that picture have to meet the demands of testing separately. The demarcation distinguishes roles within inquiry and does not determine their exact value in advance. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §4
The scope of a claim matters in the other direction as well. Compare “there is a valve that has failed somewhere” with “there is a valve that has failed on this test bench today.” A sufficiently careful inspection of the bench could count against the second statement. It cannot settle the first if the search has no definite limit. Popper makes this difference with statements about ravens. The claim that all ravens are black has an incompatible case, a raven that is not black. The existence of a black raven is established by a genuine instance. The absence of one in the next place you look leaves the open-ended existential claim untouched. The structure of a statement tells you which kinds of observations could conflict with it, as well as which kinds could support it. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §§13–15
You can also alter the scope of the valve rule by limiting it to the five devices on your bench. If you check all five under the specified conditions, you have done work that can settle a bounded claim about those devices for the conditions you checked. Popper distinguishes statements of this kind from a law with no such limit. Counting to the end of a list may put you in a position to say something about everything on it. It gives you no way of counting to the end of all the possible instances the strictly universal law covers. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §§13–15
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