The project of grounding mathematics in logic › What the Formal Record Makes Visible
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The project of grounding mathematics in logic › What the Formal Record Makes VisibleSection view · Sections in this chapter8 / 9 ↓
A familiar counting argument can be perfectly persuasive without recording every use of a definition. The authors want a derivation that can be examined after the informal insight has done its work. If two readers disagree, they can identify a primitive proposition, a definition, or an application of a rule and see whether that step has a warrant. The notation makes the details demanding to read. It also gives the readers a common object to examine.
Gödel later uses this precision for a different purpose. His 1931 paper takes Principia Mathematica and related systems as its point of reference. A system with effectively specified rules and enough arithmetic can have its formulas and proofs studied arithmetically. Under the hypotheses of the relevant incompleteness theorem, not every sentence the system can express is decidable by its proofs. This concerns the powers of a given formal system. Whether numbers and arithmetic can be explained through logical notions is a further question. A reader can accept limits on formal derivability and still investigate the reductions Principia makes.
One way to read the work is to follow the proof of the small sum backward. It leads from cardinal addition to unions of disjoint classes, from there to unit classes, and then to decisions about what class expressions mean. Each step explains something a simple use of arithmetic can leave implicit. This is a demanding way to establish a fact everyone already knows. The benefit is finding out how many different pieces of reasoning are involved in treating it as a theorem of a general system.
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