Language, world, and logical form › A limit to factual description

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 10, 20251 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 100Language, world, and logical form › A limit to factual description
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Suppose a person gives a complete report of a rescue. The report says who reached the water first, what they did, and how the people involved were affected. Someone who heard the account may still want to ask about the value of the action. The closing pages prompt us to ask how the second task relates to the first. A traditional question about what makes an action good can survive a settled account of the details. A reader may accept that distinction and still dispute Wittgenstein’s stronger claim about what an ethical proposition can express. Tractatus, 6.4–6.422.

Wittgenstein makes a further distinction in his discussion of the mystical. What prompts wonder, he suggests, is that there is a world at all. A proposition describes some way the world is. Asking whether those descriptions exhaust what could matter about the world puts pressure on how we understand the project. As 6.52 remarks, resolving the questions of natural science would not thereby answer the problems of life. The tension is between a limit to an account of facts and the temptation to regard that account as a complete answer to every possible question. Tractatus, 6.44–6.522.

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