Language, world, and logical form › The Problem Wittgenstein Inherited

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 10, 20252 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 100Language, world, and logical form › The Problem Wittgenstein Inherited
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Wittgenstein credits Frege and Russell as influences in the preface. He makes a more particular acknowledgment when he says Russell showed how the logical form of a proposition can differ from its apparent form. The point matters to Wittgenstein because how a sentence looks on the page can be misleading. He asks an additional question about what the analysis would disclose if taken as far as possible. Tractatus, preface, 3.325 and 4.0031.

Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions gives one way into that problem. The present king of France can appear to name a particular person even when there is no such person. An analysis can instead ask whether there is exactly one person who satisfies the description and whether he has the predicate in question. The point for the Tractatus is that an apparent name in an ordinary sentence need not be a simple name in its full analysis. The distinction prevents a mistaken inference from the number of words on the page to the number of objects represented. Tractatus, 3.24, 3.325 and 4.0031.

A proposition can be a logical picture. It may have no visible likeness to the state of affairs it represents. What matters is how its elements are combined, how they stand for the things involved, and how their combination represents a possible way for those things to be related. A proposition can therefore have a sense even if the state of affairs it represents does not obtain. Tractatus, 2.12–2.225 and 4.01–4.022.

What a picture shares with the world

A picture relates its elements in a definite way. To represent something, it needs a correspondence between those elements and the objects they represent, and room for a corresponding arrangement of those objects. A picture can be false. Its sense is available before we find out whether what it depicts obtains.

That last point makes it possible to understand a report before checking it. You can learn that a lamp is off after being told it was on, and the discovery will give you a reason to reject the claim rather than to wonder what was meant. The picture theory is designed to explain how the one proposition remains available through both possibilities. Wittgenstein distinguishes this capacity to be true or false from the operation of tautologies and contradictions. Tractatus, 2.21–2.225 and 4.46–4.466.

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