Language, world, and logical form › The Argument, Step by Step

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 10, 20253 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 100Language, world, and logical form › The Argument, Step by Step
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Take the familiar sentence “The cat is on the mat.” It presents a particular possible arrangement. If the cat is somewhere else, that gives you a reason to say the original proposition was false. The cat and mat illustrate how representation works in ordinary language. They need not be the simple objects the book’s theory requires. Recognizing a difference between the picture and what it depicts helps explain how a person can understand a claim before learning whether it is true.

Putting a sentence inside another sentence can tell us about the number of words in it or how the speaker uses them. The claim about showing is narrower. A proposition cannot depict the logical form that makes depicting possible as though that form were one more contingent arrangement of objects. The very attempt would have to make use of the possibility of representation it seeks to present. You can see part of what Wittgenstein means when two propositions with incompatible arrangements show their conflict by the way they are constructed. Tractatus, 4.12–4.1213.

Suppose we use “the gate is open” and “the lamp is on” for two ordinary claims. The conjunction is true exactly when both are true. To construct its truth table, list the four possibilities for gate and lamp, then mark the conjunction true only in the row where both claims are true. That exercise illustrates a truth-function. The point is compatible with there being more logical structure to each ordinary sentence than the illustration displays. Proposition 6 generalizes by means of an operation that denies every member of a selected group of propositions. Tractatus, 5.01–5.101, 5.5–5.51 and 6–6.001.

Now compare “the lamp is on or the lamp is off,” where “off” means the negation of “on.” For that report to be true, the world need not settle the question of the lamp in a particular way. Its contradictory counterpart is true under no assignment. Wittgenstein says these two extremes lack sense (sinnlos). Both belong to the symbolism and display features of it. That status differs from the unsinnig he assigns to his own elucidatory sentences at 6.54. Ogden’s English wording can obscure the distinction by using “senseless” more broadly. The German or the Pears–McGuinness column makes the change of term easier to see. Tractatus, 4.46–4.4611, 6.1–6.12 and 6.54.

The remarks on value make several distinct claims. At 6.421 Wittgenstein says ethics cannot be put into words, calls it transcendental, and links it with aesthetics. At 6.52–6.521 he distinguishes solving scientific questions from finding that a problem of life has disappeared. At 6.522 he says that what cannot be put into words makes itself manifest and connects this with the mystical. The book makes these moves separately. Reading them together requires more than grouping ethics, art, and the meaning of life into one category of things that can be shown. Tractatus, 6.421 and 6.52–6.522.

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