Soul and the capacities of living things › Matter, Form, and a Living Body
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Soul and the capacities of living things › Matter, Form, and a Living BodySection view · Sections in this chapter2 / 9 ↓
In Book II.1 Aristotle distinguishes matter, form, and the concrete thing made up of both. Matter is what is capable of being a thing of a certain kind. Form is what makes it actually a thing of that kind. In the case he cares about, the concrete thing to explain is the living animal or plant. Its soul is form, in the sense of the principle by which the body is alive.
Consider the shape given to wax by a stamp, one of Aristotle's illustrations. The wax and the shape can be distinguished in a description. We can say whether the stamp had a circular impression without specifying how much wax was used. Yet there are not two material objects lying on the desk after stamping, a piece of wax on one side and its shape on the other. In a living thing the relevant form involves far more than outline or arrangement. It accounts for the capacities that let us describe what that thing is and what it does as a living thing. De Anima II.1
Aristotle calls soul the first actuality of a natural organized body. The distinction is between already having the capacities characteristic of a kind of life and exercising them at a particular moment. Having sight and presently looking at the door illustrate these two senses of actuality.
Aristotle asks us to imagine that an eye were an animal in its own right. Its sight would then be its soul, because sight is the capacity that explains what an eye is. When the capacity is absent altogether, an eye in a painted portrait can be called an eye by resemblance or name. Aristotle is describing how to identify the organ in an explanation. The example does not require us to call an ordinary eye that cannot see by a new name. It asks us to distinguish the description of an organ by its function from a description by appearance alone.
The same point prevents a misleading picture of the body's potentiality. Aristotle is not asking us to start with a corpse and imagine adding something that turns it on. An appropriate living body already has organs and materials suited to its activities. He expressly distinguishes such a body from one that has lost its soul. The definition makes us ask what a body has the capacity to do in virtue of the way it is alive, rather than how a separate thing might occupy any material it happens to find. De Anima II.1–2
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