Soul and the capacities of living things › Receiving Form in Perception

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20263 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 80Soul and the capacities of living things › Receiving Form in Perception
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Suppose you see the blue of a cup. The clay stays where it is. Yet perception is directed at the cup. Aristotle needs an explanation that connects seeing with the visible object without treating it as ingestion of a portion of its substance.

He develops another use of the wax and stamp comparison in De Anima II.12. Wax receives the impressed shape of a signet without receiving the metal of which the signet is made. Likewise, he says, sensation receives sensible form without matter. The analogy identifies what is received in relation to the original object. It does not by itself tell us that the eye literally acquires the color of the cup in the ordinary way that a piece of cloth takes on blue dye. Whether and in what way a bodily alteration takes place is a further question.

Aristotle offers more than that one comparison. In Book II.5 he distinguishes acquiring a capacity from passing into its exercise. What is already capable of sensing does not need to be built anew each time it encounters a perceptible object. In Book II.12 he describes the sensory power and the organ as distinguishable in account even though sensation is the activity of an organized bodily magnitude. The structure of the organ matters. He explains damage by an overpowering stimulus in terms of the disruption of the organ's capacity to discriminate. These are elements of his own analysis of sensing, which should be read as an ancient explanation of its operation. De Anima II.5 and II.12

A second example helps with what counts as the object. You might see a white object across the room and take it to be a particular person's coat. Its color and its being that person's coat are different aspects of the judgment. Aristotle distinguishes proper objects of an individual sense, such as color for sight, from features like movement that more than one sense can detect, and from incidental objects about which recognition can be mistaken. He uses the example of someone identified incidentally through what is seen. The color alone does not establish the person's identity. De Anima II.6 Book III.3

This matters when Aristotle gives perceptual error a restricted role. If you remember only the line that sensation is reliable, it can sound as if he thinks everything we report on the basis of a glance must be true. In Book III.3 he contrasts apprehension of the proper object with judgments about what possesses the quality and describes the latter as liable to error. The difference between noticing color and saying what object bears it gives the qualification a concrete purpose.

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