Soul and the capacities of living things › The Difficulty About Intellect
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Soul and the capacities of living things › The Difficulty About IntellectSection view · Sections in this chapter7 / 9 ↓
In De Anima III.4, Aristotle asks how the soul's thinking capacity can take on intelligible forms. He emphasizes its receptivity. If it came already determined in a way that interfered with what it can receive, it would not be open to the range of things we can think about. A writing tablet with no actual characters on it supplies his illustration of how what is thinkable can be present potentially. In the same discussion he contrasts the effect of a very strong sensation on a sense organ with the power of thought to take up intelligible objects. He treats intellect differently from the powers whose activities are those of a specific bodily sense organ.
In Book III.5, Aristotle distinguishes the mind insofar as it becomes whatever is thinkable from a productive factor likened to light. Light makes potentially visible colors visible in actuality, which is the role of the analogy. It points to a condition that makes the potential object actually available. The chapter then speaks of the productive intellect as separable and associates it with immortality and eternity. It also refers to a passive mind as destructible. The passage is short. It does not make all the connections a reader might want between the capacity described in III.4 and the contrasted roles in III.5.
A difficulty was already visible in Book II.1, where Aristotle said that the powers that are actualities of bodily parts are inseparable in that respect and left room to consider powers to which that account does not apply. Book III.5 makes the room for an exception matter. Yet Book III.7–8 still connects our thinking with images. We need to ask what “separable” would apply to, how the separated item would relate to a person's activity of thinking, and whether a claim about it could be a claim about the continuation of a particular person's life.
In III.5 Aristotle associates a productive intellect with separability. To infer that an individual person's memories and character survive death, we would need a further argument connecting that person's continuing life with the separable intellect. The attribution of separability by itself does not supply that argument.
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