Soul and the capacities of living things › Powers That Can Come Apart

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20262 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 80Soul and the capacities of living things › Powers That Can Come Apart
Reading section 3 of 9 · Powers That Can Come Apart · 2 minSection 3 of 9 · 2 min

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Soul and the capacities of living things › Powers That Can Come ApartSection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 9 ↓

The general definition leaves much of the work undone. A plant takes in nourishment, an animal feels something when it is touched, and a person can work out a consequence of a claim. Why do we count all three as ways of living, and why do we give different explanations of their activities?

In De Anima II.2–3, Aristotle distinguishes capacities for nutrition, perception, appetite, movement from place to place and thought. A plant can nourish itself without perceiving. In mortal beings the power of perception does not turn up without the nutritive power. Aristotle also takes touch to be the most basic animal sense, allowing that an animal might have it without the other senses. On his account, sensing can occasion pleasure and pain, and these can give rise to desire. Movement from place to place is a further capacity. He recognizes animals that have sensation but do not move from place to place.

These comparisons are more useful than treating the powers as three sealed compartments. The point of placing nutrition before perception is that an organism can have the first capacity without having the second. It does not follow that every perceptive animal can exercise every kind of sense or that sensing automatically accounts for all the other activities of animal life. In Book III.9 Aristotle asks whether the distinction between capacities is a distinction between parts only in definition or also in spatial location. His analysis of desire also warns against assuming that a simple division into rational and nonrational parts will neatly assign everything an animal does. De Anima III.9

Book II.4 gives a method for investigating these distinctions. To explain a power, look first at the activity the power makes possible. To understand the activity, look at its object. For nourishment we start with what counts as food and what a living thing does with it. For sight we ask what is visible and how a seeing animal comes to see it. The order matters. Merely listing the organs an organism has would not tell us what the capacities are, or why one capacity should count as distinct from another. De Anima II.4

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