Doing things by speaking › From Performatives to the General Theory of Speech Acts

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated May 13, 20254 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 102Doing things by speaking › From Performatives to the General Theory of Speech Acts
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The division between performatives and constatives becomes harder to sustain in the later lectures. Consider someone who says there is a cat on the mat. It is fair to ask whether the statement is true. It also matters whether the speaker is repeating a rumor, testifying as a witness, or joking. The practice of asserting has circumstances and standards of its own, just as promising does. The original distinction remains a useful way into the topic, but Austin treats it as a special case of a more general theory of speech acts. Austin, lectures XI–XII, especially pp. 133–148.

The later lectures distinguish three questions about a particular occasion of speaking. What was said? What did the speaker do in saying it? What did the speaker do by saying it? The answers can describe a single event from different angles. They do not require three independent performances.

The locutionary act concerns saying something with a certain sense and reference. Austin distinguishes the making of sounds, the speaking of words with a construction, and their use with a particular sense and reference. Someone can mimic the sounds of a sentence in a language they have never learned. When a person tells you the door is open and means the door to your left, the act includes the relevant use of words and their reference on that occasion. Austin, lecture VIII, pp. 94–99.

The illocutionary act is what the speaker does in saying it. A person could tell you the door is open to warn you about an escaped pet, to answer your question about whether an office is ready for visitors, or to ask you to close it. The sentence’s understandable content makes those uses possible, and the force comes from what is happening on the occasion. Austin gives a role to conventions, and considers how context and such features as mood and tone can help make the force clear. Austin, lectures VI and VIII, pp. 98–101.

The perlocutionary act concerns what someone brings about by speaking, such as persuading the listener to go back and close the door, or alarming them. An effect can exceed what the speaker intended. The listener can also recognize a warning and ignore it. That distinguishes recognizing what action the speaker was performing from being brought to act as the speaker hoped. Austin, lectures VIII–IX, pp. 101–103 and 116–119.

Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocutionary

The locutionary act is saying something with a certain sense and reference. The illocutionary act is what you do in saying it, such as warning someone. Its force depends on the conventions that make the warning recognizable. The perlocutionary act is what you bring about by speaking, such as frightening someone who hears the warning.

Austin calls the hearer’s understanding of the meaning and force uptake. Hearing and understanding a warning belongs to the warning’s successful delivery. Being frightened by it is a further possible effect. He also distinguishes the conventional effects an illocution may have, such as the name a ship now has, and the responses it may invite. Those are reasons to avoid a shortcut in which everything that happens after the utterance simply counts as perlocution. Austin, lecture IX, pp. 116–119.

Lecture XII tries out five families of illocutionary acts. Verdictives deliver an assessment, as when a judge issues a finding. Exercitives exercise authority or a right, as in appointing or voting. Commissives undertake commitments, as in promising. Behabitives include responses to someone’s conduct, such as apologizing or congratulating. Expositives help make clear what one is doing with an argument or conversation, such as conceding or giving an example. Austin treats the grouping as preliminary. A concession may acknowledge evidence and simultaneously commit you to a stance toward what has been argued. Austin, lecture XII, pp. 148–164.

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