Doing things by speaking › Making a promise
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A friend says, “I promise to pay you back on Friday.” You can immediately ask what the friend has undertaken. You can also ask later whether they kept their word or whether they ever intended to pay. Those questions have different answers. J. L. Austin starts with utterances like this because it is easy to see that the words can be part of performing an action. One of his examples is the appropriate formula for naming a ship at its launching. Someone needs to make the utterance at the right point in the procedure, in the right capacity, for there to be a naming. Austin, lecture I, pp. 5–9.
Austin delivered the William James Lectures at Harvard in 1955. The material appeared posthumously as How to Do Things with Words in 1962, edited by J. O. Urmson. The sequence of lectures matters because Austin changes the framework along the way. His initial examples separate cases that philosophers often handled together, while the later lectures ask what the apparently different utterances have in common. Austin, editor’s preface and lectures I–II and XI–XII.
Consider the difference between “The meeting begins at nine” and “I declare the meeting open.” A participant who recites the second sentence while waiting for the chair has done something different from chairing the meeting. A chair who utters the first sentence can be reporting a schedule or reminding those who are still talking. These examples suggest why a complete account needs the utterance and the occasion together. The same words can do different work, and two different expressions can do much the same work.
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