Doing things by speaking › How Performatives Succeed: Felicity Conditions
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Doing things by speaking › How Performatives Succeed: Felicity ConditionsSection view · Sections in this chapter4 / 9 ↓
To make this rigorous, Austin catalogued the conditions under which a performative succeeds. These are the felicity conditions, the requirements Austin uses to assess whether an utterance is fully felicitous. Failures of these requirements can have different effects.
Austin sets out six conditions in lecture II. The letters group related failures, and he says he is making a preliminary scheme, one that admits overlap between cases. The point is to make an unfamiliar kind of diagnosis possible. A listener can distinguish whether people were in a position to act, whether they went through the steps, and whether the act they performed was later abused. Austin, lecture II, pp. 14–18, and lecture III.
The A conditions concern an accepted procedure and an occasion to which it can apply. A.1 asks whether the procedure exists and has the relevant conventional effect. Suppose a club recognizes no motion by which one member can take over as its chair. Asserting such a takeover at a meeting cannot by itself supply that missing procedure. A.2 asks whether the actual people and circumstances suit a procedure that does exist. A club that permits appointments by its committee does not thereby permit any visiting observer to make one. Austin, lecture II, pp. 14–15.
The B conditions distinguish doing the procedure correctly from doing it completely. Suppose a committee can appoint a chair by putting a proposal to a vote and announcing the result. Announcing that the wrong member was elected is an example of doing a required step incorrectly. Proposing the person and never taking the vote would leave a necessary step undone. Austin treats failures of invocation or execution as misfires. The attempted act is void in the intended sense even if the attempt has consequences of its own. Austin, lecture II, pp. 15–18.
The remaining conditions, Γ.1 and Γ.2, apply when a procedure calls for particular thoughts, feelings, or intentions, or requires relevant behavior afterward. A person who undertakes to repay you with no intention of doing so can make an insincere promise. Someone can intend to repay you when they speak and then fail to do what they promised. Both differ from a case in which there was never a promise. Austin groups these kinds of infelicity as abuses. His labels help track which aspect of the performance is defective. Austin, lecture II, pp. 15–18 and lecture IV.
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