Meaning and verification › When Grammar Suggests the Wrong Question

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20262 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
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Part 9 of 12Science and Explanation
Chapter 110Meaning and verification › When Grammar Suggests the Wrong Question
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Ayer also asks how a person might come to mistake a sequence of words for a factual claim. He compares saying that martyrs suffer with saying that martyrs exist. The two English sentences can look as though they perform the same work. One of them ascribes suffering to people of a certain kind. The other says there are people of that kind. If we mistake existence for a further property of a martyr, an intelligible question about whether there are any martyrs turns into a search for a special feature possessed by the martyrs who exist. Ayer takes this to illustrate how a philosophical problem can grow out of a superficial similarity in grammar. Language, Truth and Logic, ch. I, examples of existence and predication

Another of his examples is the difference between saying that dogs are faithful and saying that unicorns are fictitious. In the usual reading of the first, a speaker ascribes a quality to animals. Ayer thinks the familiarity of that reading can tempt a person to say that unicorns must exist in some way in order to have a special quality called being fictitious. To compare the two readings, imagine someone admitting that no unicorn has ever been found and acknowledging that they occur in stories. Those claims can be assessed by asking different questions from the ones we would use when considering the behavior of a dog. Clarifying what the sentence does may dissolve the demand for an unfamiliar sort of animal to bear its predicate. Language, Truth and Logic, ch. I, example of fictional unicorns

This part of the book makes room for two distinct outcomes of analysis. An apparently puzzling statement can turn out to have a different logical form from the sentence in which it was expressed. In such a case the task is to make a comprehensible claim easier to recognize. In another case the proposed reading may leave us unable to say what a speaker is undertaking to report, even after the wording has been made clear. The second outcome is the one Ayer needs if the verification principle is to rule out a class of apparent factual claims. The first is a reason to examine each use before passing judgment. It leaves open whether someone could give a clearer formulation of a position Ayer would reject. Language, Truth and Logic, ch. I

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