Communication and social coordination › How a reason can be challenged
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If a member says the diversion adds five minutes, a listener can ask how it was measured. If the speaker says tradespeople should bear that inconvenience, the listener can ask what norm makes the distribution fair. If the speaker volunteers to endorse the arrangement after the first trial period, listeners can wonder how seriously to take the commitment. Habermas distinguishes claims concerning truth, normative rightness, and sincerity. A listener who accepts the traffic data can still dispute the recommendation. A listener who regards the recommendation as fair can still have good grounds for doubting the stated commitment. These disagreements differ in what would count as a response. Timing the existing route and the diversion under comparable conditions bears on the first, discussion of what burdens each group may reasonably bear on the second. Later behavior can give the people who heard the promise evidence about the third. Volume I, chapter III, pp. 295–308 and volume II, chapter VI, pp. 119–122.
This does not turn every conversation into a debate about all three dimensions. Ordinarily, a claim makes one dimension especially salient while relying on others in the background. The person offering evidence about the route expects the others to understand the expression “through traffic,” to regard the report as relevant, and to take the account of the measurements as honest. If a participant asks what “through” means for delivery vehicles, the group has a problem of intelligibility to settle before it can assess the factual claim. If someone disputes the five-minute figure, they can turn from arranging the trial to considering the evidence for that assertion. Habermas distinguishes this kind of explicit argumentation from all the routine coordination that takes place with accepted assumptions. People move back and forth between the two in a single meeting. Volume I, chapter I, §1, and chapter III, pp. 295–308.
J. L. Austin’s account of speech acts gives Habermas a way of explaining the difference between what a speaker publicly does in speaking and the further effect those words might have. An association member can ask a colleague to withdraw an amendment. The request itself is recognizable from the utterance and its circumstances. The speaker might also intend to make the colleague feel isolated, in the hope that the colleague will vote differently next time. That further aim may be concealed. The listener’s understanding of the request can enter into coordination in one instance. In the other, the speaker is counting on a causal effect of talking. The distinction lets us ask how agreement was produced, even when the vocabulary sounded perfectly civil. Volume I, chapter III, pp. 288–295.
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