Experience and changing forms of understanding › A Test That Uses Consciousness's Own Standard
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Experience and changing forms of understanding › A Test That Uses Consciousness's Own StandardSection view · Sections in this chapter2 / 8 ↓
When you check a thermometer against a trusted instrument, you already have a standard outside the object under test. Hegel cannot simply assume the philosophical equivalent of a trusted instrument. If he brought a finished theory of knowledge to the examination, a rival account could ask why it had to accept his theory before the case had even begun. In the Introduction, §§73–89, he instead distinguishes what consciousness takes its object to be in itself from what it knows about that object. Both sides of that distinction are available for inspection in the position being tested.
Suppose consciousness says the object it knows is a bare particular and that it knows this object directly. The test asks whether the experience it calls direct knowing can supply the bare particular it claims to know. If its best example relies on words whose role can recur in another situation, that matters precisely because of what the original view promised. Someone who already expects sensory knowledge to use repeatable concepts can accept the same example without embarrassment. The result depends on the initial commitment.
Hegel calls a failure determinate negation when the result belongs to the specific view that failed. If a theory denies the need for mediation and its own test reveals mediation, the outcome identifies something that the next view has to explain. Simply declaring the original view false would leave its successor entirely open. Hegel thinks that attending to the particular failure can give a transition its direction. This is a claim about how the inquiry is organized. An actual reader can accept the diagnosis and still contest whether Hegel has shown that exactly one successor follows.
There is another complication. In ordinary talk, we might say that the world stays put while our beliefs change. In the Introduction Hegel says a change in knowledge also changes what counts as the object for that form of consciousness. The original object was what consciousness took to be the thing as it truly is. An experience that undermines this account also unsettles the distinction between its object and its knowing of it. This does not require the thinker to produce a physical tree. It requires the thinker to see why the tree can no longer play exactly the epistemic role it played before.
Follow the position as it sees itself. Then ask what a reader following the entire inquiry can see about the transition. The difference matters because a form of consciousness can encounter a new object without already understanding how its old commitments produced the change.
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