Experience and changing forms of understanding › From Pointing to Perception

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated July 21, 20262 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 75Experience and changing forms of understanding › From Pointing to Perception
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Sense-certainty promises knowledge of the particular as it stands before you. Hegel takes two ordinary words, "here" and "now," and varies their use. What counted as here when you faced a tree gives way to the here of a house when you turn around. The expression persists across what is pointed out. Likewise, in the written note about night, the "now" survives the replacement of night by day. Hegel calls what endures through those transitions a universal. He does not conclude that the tree or house is imaginary. He concludes that the apparently immediate presentation has a structure that the account of simple contact failed to recognize. Read the different versions of the test in chapter I, §§95–110.

Try to protect the position by pointing instead of speaking. The gesture takes time. By the time you identify the point at which it began, that moment is already past. You can successfully indicate a particular in ordinary conversation, but the demonstration of its immediacy now relies on an ordered movement through different moments. Hegel's argument concerns the claim that the isolated sensory encounter supplies its own sufficient account. Asking him to explain how context makes an everyday gesture work is a better objection than claiming that he forgot people can point.

In chapter II, §§111–131, perception treats the object as a thing with several properties. Hegel uses a grain of salt. Its whiteness and its taste can be considered separately, but they are supposed to belong to one thing. The difficulty concerns how the thing can be one and how it can hold properties together without collapsing their differences. Hegel follows perception as it tries placing the unity on one side of the encounter and the plurality on the other, then revises that assignment. In chapter III, §§132–165, understanding seeks a different kind of unity through force and law. The sequence is more instructive if you track what each stage tries to explain than if you memorize the labels as levels on a ladder.

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