Experience and changing forms of understanding › From an Individual Standpoint to Spirit
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Experience and changing forms of understanding › From an Individual Standpoint to SpiritSection view · Sections in this chapter5 / 8 ↓
After lordship and bondage, Hegel turns to Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness. Stoic freedom shows how someone can take thinking to be independent of a given social position. Yet freedom understood only this way leaves open what a person should actually think or do. Skepticism exercises an ability to negate what presents itself as authoritative. It then has to reckon with the fact that the skeptic continues having particular experiences while disavowing their authority. Unhappy consciousness lives a division between the changeable self and an unchangeable essence. These forms have their own difficulties rather than merely serving as further episodes in the story of the lord and bondsman. Reason and then spirit carry the inquiry into more concrete ways of finding oneself in a shared world.
Baillie uses Mind in his title for Geist, which is also rendered in English as spirit. In the part of the book called Spirit, its social sense is particularly important. Acts can mean something publicly that they could never mean if the actor were simply declaring their own private intention. To fulfill a duty to one's family or exercise a public office is to act within practices others also understand. Hegel examines those practices when their demands appear to agree and when they conflict.
The ethical order, chapter VI.A, §§444 onward, divides into human and divine law. Hegel associates the former with the community's public life and the latter with the family, including its duty to the dead. In the analysis of ethical action, fulfilling one law can violate the other. Think of Antigone's obligation to bury her brother coming against a public prohibition. Treat the two obligations as belonging to the same ethical world, and the problem becomes harder than deciding who happens to feel more strongly. Each party acts from a norm with some claim to authority. Hegel's historical and gendered assignments of the two spheres belong to the account under examination. You can understand the collision without accepting those assignments as a prescription.
Later, in Absolute Freedom and Terror, §§582–595, freedom takes the form of a universal will that is unwilling to leave authority to separate groups or offices. But any definite act is performed by particular persons in a particular capacity. A government claiming to act for everyone thus appears as a particular faction. If differentiation itself is treated as disloyalty to universal freedom, the common will has little positive work it can recognize as its own. The Terror is Hegel's example of this destructive result. This is a philosophical reading of tensions in revolutionary freedom, not a comprehensive account of what caused a historical revolution.
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