Entitlement and the limits of the state › Acquisition, Transfer, and Rectification
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Entitlement and the limits of the state › Acquisition, Transfer, and RectificationSection view · Sections in this chapter2 / 8 ↓
In Part II, chapter 7, section I, Nozick sets out the three parts of his theory. Justice in acquisition concerns how someone first becomes entitled to hold what was previously unheld. Justice in transfer concerns how a holding passes from someone entitled to it to another person. Rectification concerns what people owe when they have violated the first two principles or benefited from those violations. Nozick lays out the structure of the theory in this chapter. He does not supply a finished account of all three principles.
Suppose someone freely gave me a watch. If that person stole it, consent to the gift does not settle whether I am entitled to keep it. I must ask about the starting point from which the watch entered the transaction. If the watch was theirs to give, the history looks different. In the ideal case, a just initial acquisition and a sequence of just transfers yield a just holding. In a real case, information about theft, fraud, or an earlier claim can change what further steps are due.
Nozick calls this a historical conception. On an end-result conception, the relevant standard can be applied to a distribution by inspecting information about the present outcome. A patterned principle has a different feature: it asks for shares to vary with something such as merit, need, or contribution. A patterned principle can be historical too. A principle of distributing in accordance with past efforts can require past information. What Nozick's view rejects is the need to establish that a distribution fits such a pattern once the relevant entitlements have been established.
This distinction helps state the disagreement with John Rawls. Rawls assesses the basic structure of a society by principles including one about the prospects of its least advantaged members. Nozick asks how those rules would affect the freedom to transfer what people are already entitled to hold. One concern is whether patterns can survive such transfers. A further question is what establishes the entitlements from which the argument starts.
The expression “distributive justice” can suggest a picture Nozick questions at the beginning of chapter 7. The picture is of a stock of resources under somebody's control, ready to be divided. If a committee actually has such a stock, asking how it should divide the stock is perfectly intelligible. Suppose, instead, that the things in view were made or acquired by different people and are already held under a variety of agreements. Treating these holdings as a stock to be divided takes for granted something the theory is meant to investigate: who has a claim to decide how each thing can be used.
A different stock of resources illustrates the other direction of that argument. If several people created a fund under a common agreement, the history of the fund can give the committee a duty to divide it in a certain way. In that case the relevant claim is established in part by an earlier agreement. A distribution that looks generous in the aggregate can fail to meet the agreement. A historical theory has room for such a complaint. The issue is which entitlements the history created, and whether the person making the decision is authorized to treat the resources as theirs to give.
The distinction leaves open how far an owner may limit a later transfer or what kinds of terms an agreement can legitimately impose. Nozick's three-part account marks where those questions belong. It does not answer them just by directing attention to the past.
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