Entitlement and the limits of the state › The Proviso and the Past
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Entitlement and the limits of the state › The Proviso and the PastSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 8 ↓
Nozick's account of acquisition is often associated with Locke. In chapter 7, “Locke's Theory of Acquisition” and “The Proviso”, he makes clear that Locke's picture of mixing one's labor with something leaves questions unanswered. Why should joining one's labor to material yield ownership of the material as a whole? He looks for a restriction on appropriation that can matter even if one has another account of how ownership arises. His version of the proviso rules out an acquisition that worsens the position of others who are no longer free to use the thing acquired, in the relevant comparison.
This constraint can matter after the first acquisition too. A resource may at first have substitutes, so that appropriating one supply need not worsen others' access to what they need. Nozick discusses the problem of someone controlling the only water source in a desert, including the case where other sources dry up after the remaining supply was acquired. An ordinary ownership claim need not settle what the owner may then demand. An account of entitlement has to answer how people who depend on the resource are affected by its removal from common access.
Rectification is at least as difficult. Imagine that land was taken from a family, later sold repeatedly, and finally bought by someone who did not know the history. The purchase record by itself cannot tell us which present holdings are just. But saying that an injustice occurred does not tell us in full what the descendants of the people involved would now have had, nor what present remedy would track the losses. Nozick describes these problems near the start of chapter 7. His sketches are intentionally incomplete.
Near the end of that chapter, Nozick entertains the possibility that certain patterned principles could serve as rough guides to rectification when the history is inadequately known. He even allows that sufficiently serious past injustices might call for a more extensive state in the short run to put them right. To judge a particular transfer payment scheme, then, we need to ask whether it could be justified in rectifying injustices that actually occurred. A comparison with an ideal history in which the existing holdings were all justly obtained leaves that question open.
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