Entitlement and the limits of the state › The Passage From Anarchy to a State

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20262 min read
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Part 10 of 12Justice and Political Authority
Chapter 122Entitlement and the limits of the state › The Passage From Anarchy to a State
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Section 5 of 8 · 2 min read

Entitlement and the limits of the state › The Passage From Anarchy to a StateSection view · Sections in this chapter5 / 8 ↓

Part I begins with a broadly Lockean state of nature. People have rights and need ways to defend them. Some can seek assistance from others, and associations can specialize in providing protection. In chapters 2 and 5, Nozick considers why one association might become dominant in a territory even though no one set out to found a state. When agencies repeatedly disagree about how to settle cases, those arrangements that reliably prevail or coordinate with one another have an advantage. Nozick offers an invisible-hand explanation of how a dominant arrangement could emerge from those choices.

Dominance alone leaves a moral problem. Suppose an independent person accuses an agency's client of wrongdoing and plans to demand compensation using a procedure the agency regards as seriously unreliable. The agency's clients have an interest in avoiding wrongful punishment. Nozick argues that the agency can stop sufficiently risky procedures applied to them. Its case does not start with a special right to suppress every competitor or every exercise of self-defense. It appeals to the rights of its clients and to the risks posed by particular forms of private enforcement.

Stopping the procedure imposes a cost on the independent. The method might in fact have resolved this particular dispute fairly. If the independent can no longer exercise it, their ability to protect their rights can be reduced even when the initial grievance is genuine. Under the principle of compensation Nozick develops in chapter 4 and applies in chapter 5, those who impose and benefit from the prohibition owe compensation to the independents it disadvantages. Supplying protective services is his proposed way of meeting that obligation in the relevant cases. That is how protection extends beyond the people who initially contracted for it.

The distinction between an ultraminimal state and a minimal state marks two stages in the reasoning. An ultraminimal state has the relevant exercise of force in its hands and offers protection only to people who buy it. The minimal state extends protection under the compensatory argument. Whether the proposed prohibition and compensation can meet the constraints Nozick sets is a substantive question. An independent might object that the agency is judging its own procedures more favorably than those of its rivals. Its power to announce a standard does not itself tell us that the standard is fair.

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