Evidence and scientific realism › Does Success Give Us Reason to Believe More?
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Evidence and scientific realism › Does Success Give Us Reason to Believe More?Section view · Sections in this chapter6 / 7 ↓
A realist can press the significance of a theory's success. When a theory keeps producing correct predictions in unfamiliar cases, it is reasonable to ask what accounts for the success. Van Fraassen discusses this through the argument that we infer the best explanation. The ordinary example is a mouse in the wall. Noises and the disappearance of food can give you reason to believe that a mouse is present. The same pattern of inference might seem to support belief in the unobservable things scientists use in giving explanations. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §§3–4
Van Fraassen asks whether the successful cases show that people infer a theory's truth or that they infer what it gets right about the observable phenomena. Both descriptions can fit the mouse example, because the mouse is an animal that could be seen. The two ways of describing the conclusion diverge when one accepts an account of what cannot be observed in order to account for an observation. Relying on its explanatory success leaves a question about whether that success warrants belief in everything the explanation uses. His response is that a claim about what researchers actually infer needs to be compared with rival accounts of their practice. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §3, “Inference to the Best Explanation”
A critic can reply that a sustained pattern of precise success calls for more explanation than saying the models fit. For instance, a theory can generate successful predictions about both the shape of tracks in the chamber and what happens in a very different apparatus. That makes the relationship between the lines of evidence worth understanding. The constructive empiricist can recognize the success, compare it with alternatives, and use the theory to investigate how it occurred. The dispute concerns the further step from doing that work to treating the entire description as true. In van Fraassen's argument with J. J. C. Smart, even an account of why one theory reproduces the usable predictions of another need not start by treating the favored theory as wholly true. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §4, discussion of Smart
Return to the line in the chamber. Someone can describe what was observed, state what an accepted model says produced it, and specify the observable results the model predicts elsewhere. Those are different things to establish. Asking which of them the evidence warrants, and where the additional commitment of taking the whole account as true begins, makes the realist and constructive empiricist disagreement concrete. It also gives a scientist who uses the model something to examine before deciding how far to stand behind it. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §§1.3, 2–4, and ch. III
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