Evidence and scientific realism › Literal Claims and the Aim of Science
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Evidence and scientific realism › Literal Claims and the Aim of ScienceSection view · Sections in this chapter2 / 7 ↓
Imagine that one theory says ordinary matter consists of atoms and another says it is fundamentally continuous. Suppose for the sake of argument that the theories yield precisely the same predictions about the observable cases under study. Their success in those cases gives us a way to compare what each can account for. It leaves their claims about the underlying constitution of matter opposed. A literal understanding of a theory preserves that disagreement. If the theory says that something exists, an interpretation can clarify what it says exists. Removing the implication of existence would change what the theory says. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §1.2
Van Fraassen distinguishes this point about meaning from one about belief. Understanding what a theory asserts is part of deciding which of its claims to accept. Someone can make sense of incompatible assertions about matter without having enough reason to pick one as true. The same distinction applies to the more ordinary decision to work with one of the accounts. A group might choose it for its capacity to guide a new investigation. That decision does not settle every claim the account makes. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §§1.2–1.3
Both a scientific realist and a constructive empiricist can read scientific claims literally. In the position van Fraassen sets out as scientific realism, science aims to arrive at theories that give a literally true account of the world, and accepting a theory involves believing it is true. The constructive empiricist allows the reading while changing the account of the aim. Empirical adequacy requires getting the observable phenomena right. A person who accepts a theory can therefore take it to be adequate while leaving open whether its account of what cannot be observed is true. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §§1.1–1.3 · Oxford chapter summary
There is a substantial commitment in doing that. Imagine that an account of the lines in the chamber has handled every run made so far. Believing that the account is empirically adequate goes beyond endorsing a summary of those runs. It involves believing that the observable phenomena, including ones that no experimenter has yet encountered, have the features the account gives them. A future sighting can therefore show that an accepted theory falls short. Someone can be cautious about one part of the theory's description and still take an epistemic risk in accepting its adequacy. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §1.3 and ch. III, discussion of empirical adequacy
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