Evidence and scientific realism › How a Model Can Fit the Phenomena

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 1, 20264 min read
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Part 9 of 12Science and Explanation
Chapter 115Evidence and scientific realism › How a Model Can Fit the Phenomena
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Van Fraassen develops a way to state empirical adequacy using models. A theory specifies a family of structures. It also identifies parts of its models that are candidates for representing observable phenomena. Experimental and measurement reports can themselves describe structures, which he calls appearances. The theory is adequate if some model contains empirical substructures with the same relevant structure as all the appearances it needs to accommodate. The fit is a relationship between structures. The model can contain more than is used in representing those appearances. The Scientific Image, ch. III, “To Save the Phenomena”

For example, imagine a device that produces a record of three flashes at known intervals. An account of the device may include an underlying mechanism that goes through several stages between flashes. Part of a model can represent the order, spacing, and duration of all observable flashes. Whether that part fits the record can be addressed without establishing that the model's internal stages happen exactly as described. The observable behavior may give people a good reason to work further with the account. If an independent experiment reveals a persistent difference in the spacing of flashes under conditions the model covers, that difference bears on how well the model represents the phenomenon. The Scientific Image, ch. III, on models and empirical substructures

This example only uses a small set of records. The general requirement concerns the phenomena a theory is meant to accommodate. It is possible to get one measured result right by changing a parameter for that case and to adjust a second result by changing the parameter again. If the two observations have to be represented together, producing that pair of fits does not tell you whether there is one model in which both can be represented. Van Fraassen's formulation asks for a model in which the appearances can fit together. That is a stronger requirement than being able to match each isolated outcome with a different description chosen after the event. The Scientific Image, ch. III, on empirical adequacy and appearances

Empirical adequacy

An empirically adequate theory has a model whose designated empirical parts represent the relevant observable phenomena. Matching observations already made gives evidence for adequacy. The claim of adequacy extends to observable phenomena beyond that record. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §1.3 and ch. III

Van Fraassen also distinguishes things that actually happen but nobody observes from things that would happen if the world were different. A completed record could leave out real events because no instrument captured them. Those events still matter to empirical adequacy if they are observable by us in the relevant sense. That does not turn the claim of adequacy into an assertion that the same model describes the outcome in every world we can imagine. In Chapter III, van Fraassen ties adequacy to the actual phenomena. The difference is part of why testing a theory takes a particular event seriously without treating every counterfactual implication of the theory as another observation. The Scientific Image, ch. III, §§8–9

Sometimes theories that agree on the observed cases differ in where they direct the next one. Suppose both models fit the sequence of flashes under current conditions, while one gives a clear prediction for a device with a redesigned switch. The experiments so far leave both models in play. A test on the redesigned device would bear on whether their empirical commitments really coincide. If one merely gives a more convenient way to modify the mathematics while making the same empirical commitments, its advantage is different. Van Fraassen discusses this difference when considering how otherwise equivalent theories could be extended. It is a reason to identify the scope of the comparison before calling the theories empirically equivalent. The Scientific Image, ch. III, §4, “Theories and Their Extensions”

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