Evidence and scientific realism › Seeing the Object and Seeing Its Trace

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 1, 20263 min read
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Part 9 of 12Science and Explanation
Chapter 115Evidence and scientific realism › Seeing the Object and Seeing Its Trace
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A distinction between observable and unobservable things has to earn a place in this account. Van Fraassen considers Grover Maxwell's challenge that seeing passes through many kinds of assistance. We can look through a window, through glasses, and through more complex optical instruments. Drawing a sharp line between every permissible and impermissible way of seeing would be difficult. Van Fraassen shifts attention from ordering acts of seeing to asking whether their objects are observable. An observer who cannot see an object where they are standing might see that same object under other conditions. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §2

The moons of Jupiter give him a clear case. Looking through a telescope to see them from Earth does not establish that they could only ever show up as something made by a telescope. A suitably located observer could see them from closer up. Their present distance is a practical obstacle to unaided observation from the ground. Van Fraassen accepts this example as one of observation. His contrast is with the track in a cloud chamber. There, according to the theory, a particle makes a series of events possible that produce a visible trail. Seeing the trail and identifying what produced it are distinguishable achievements. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §2, Jupiter and cloud chamber examples

It is possible to learn a great deal by identifying what produced a trace. The theory may lead an experimenter to predict how the track changes as conditions in the chamber vary. The experimenter can use further observations to test the prediction. Van Fraassen's distinction asks what that evidence warrants believing about the visible phenomena and what additional belief would be involved in claiming that the theory's entire account of the cause is true. It does not require refusing to rely on a well-understood instrument or declining to say what an accepted theory represents as happening inside one. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §§1.3, 2

The argument leaves a real question about what humans can observe in the relevant sense. Van Fraassen acknowledges that the predicate is vague. A useful distinction can have good examples on each side even if a succession of intermediate cases gives no obvious place for a boundary. How much this concession helps depends on what one needs the boundary to do. If a particular inference depends on treating an object as observable, the critic can still ask whether the account says enough about that object and the conditions under which we might encounter it. The Scientific Image, ch. II, §2

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