Questions within and about a framework › One Question, Three Different Tasks
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Questions within and about a framework › One Question, Three Different TasksSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 9 ↓
Imagine a team measuring travel across a city. It can represent each journey by a start and an end event with spatial and temporal coordinates. We can distinguish three questions it might ask.
First, did two journeys end at the same place and time, within a tolerance specified in the measurement? That is a factual question. The team uses its representation and looks at the observations. Whether the representation is convenient tells it little about the particular journeys.
Second, should the team introduce a coordinate system at all? It may have a less precise method of reporting places and times that is cheaper to use. If the team needs to compare departure and arrival sequences closely, the extra precision may be worth the cost. Evidence about uncertainty, time spent recording measurements, and the performance of past analyses can affect the choice. Different uses of the data may call for different decisions.
Third, do the coordinate points really exist, quite independently of the ways to refer to them? If this just asks whether the coordinate framework includes points, we can read the rules. If it asks whether the team ought to quantify over them in making its measurements, we have returned to its choice of representation. To make it a third theoretical question, we need some account of what would count as its answer. The example adapts Carnap's discussion of introducing spacetime coordinates after a thing language is already in use. The third question here is our way of testing a purported metaphysical claim. In Carnap's own list, the third reading asks whether experience shows the scheme will be useful. He treats that as an empirical question about how well the scheme works. Establishing its usefulness would give us a reason to adopt it. That result would leave the purported metaphysical claim unsettled. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, §§2–3
This example also clarifies a limit of the approach. The team can disagree over whether its observations place the two arrivals within the agreed tolerance. Calling such a dispute a matter of framework choice would be a mistake. Conversely, if the dispute really is over which accuracy and coverage to require, examining the same pair of records again might leave the question exactly where it was.
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