Questions within and about a framework › Two Ways to Hear “There Are Numbers”

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 8, 20252 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 79Questions within and about a framework › Two Ways to Hear “There Are Numbers”
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Questions within and about a framework › Two Ways to Hear “There Are Numbers”Section view · Sections in this chapter3 / 9 ↓

Once the numerical framework is in place, the sentence “There are numbers” can express an internal claim. Start with the rule that allows a numeral such as five to be used as a number. Grant the corresponding instance and you can infer that at least one number exists. On Carnap's account, that particular internal existential statement is analytic. He contrasts it with questions brought up in the same framework whose answers require actual work, such as finding a prime above a specified bound. Both varieties belong to the practice of arithmetic. They differ in the work needed to justify an answer. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, §2, “The system of numbers”

Suppose someone agrees that the number-language permits the inference but repeats their question. They may mean to ask whether they should use that language in a theory. That is intelligible. We can ask whether a numerical formulation lets us make precise comparisons, produces useful predictions in an application, or combines well with other commitments of the theory. We can then decide whether to use it. The discussion may appeal to facts about rival formulations. Its practical conclusion recommends a way to proceed.

A third reading is the one Carnap challenges. Here a person claims to ask a theoretical question about the reality or subsistence of the numerical system independently of the framework. Their question sounds like the internal existential one, but an internal proof is set aside as irrelevant. Their question could be reinterpreted as a decision to adopt or reject the language, but the speaker insists they want to discover a fact about what there is. Carnap asks for a formulation that supplies this third question with cognitive content. He argues that the familiar debate has yet to furnish such a formulation. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, §§2–3

The distinction matters because there can be a legitimate dispute about adopting the language without there being a second theoretical fact that settles that choice. It also avoids the implication that every question asked by a philosopher is external. If someone can specify what a claim means and what bears on its answer, Carnap's challenge has done its job even if the question remains difficult.

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