Questions within and about a framework › Where a Critic Can Press
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An objector can agree that a physical claim and a decision about using a language play different roles, yet doubt the boundary Carnap draws. Suppose choosing a theory requires asking both how well it works and what its claims commit us to. If the best overall theory refers to numbers, the objector may regard that as a reason to believe in numbers. Why should we describe the same commitment as a practical acceptance on one side and a theoretical one on the other?
Quine presses a related point in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” §6. He accepts a pragmatic element in scientific revision, but extends it across the whole scheme of belief. Observations can force adjustments, and more than one adjustment can sometimes accommodate the same experience. A change in how we formulate or organize the theory need not fall on a separate side of a fixed division between choices of language and claims about facts. His discussion challenges the sharpness of the division on which Carnap relies. It does not claim that every sentence is individually refuted or confirmed by a particular observation.
A Carnapian reply begins by separating the roles even when the choices are made together. Someone who chooses to express a theory using a certain system of number terms can then be wrong about a calculation in that system. A separate inquiry into the efficiency of the notation can affect the initial choice. That much can be granted even if the boundary is hard to draw in a large scientific theory. Quine's challenge, in turn, is whether the local distinction between selecting a practice and making a move within it justifies Carnap's stronger diagnosis of philosophical ontology.
Another objection concerns the burden of showing that a question has content. A realist might hold that theoretical questions need not always have an experiment that would answer them, and might propose to justify an ontological claim by how it contributes to an explanation. This is a genuine reply only if it says what explanatory work the claim does and how its work differs from the success of the language used to state it. Carnap can then ask whether those benefits give us grounds for accepting a framework or grounds for asserting something additional. The critic need not assume in advance that those options exhaust the possibilities. This is a place to dispute the argument, rather than simply choosing which definition of reality sounds right.
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