Questions within and about a framework › What Reality Means in the Thing Language
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Carnap begins his examples with ordinary things. Imagine asking whether a white piece of paper is on a desk. We can look. If the scene is a reflection, the actual paper might be elsewhere. If a colleague claims the paper was there yesterday, we may compare observations made at different times. Carnap takes a judgment about whether an item or event is real in the scientific sense to involve placing it within a system of things and events, where it fits with what else we have reason to accept.
That account leaves ordinary realism about the paper intact. The disputed question is whether the system of things itself has the reality attributed to an item successfully placed within the system. In his treatment of the traditional dispute between realism and idealism, Carnap argues that this stretches the internal test beyond its domain. Locating an item among others cannot locate the entire system among its own members. The argument depends on his account of what “real” does in scientific thing talk. It would take a different account of the predicate to make the attempted external application intelligible.
Carnap observes that we ordinarily take up the language of things early in life, before deciding whether to keep using it. Carnap treats continuing to use thing language as acceptance in a practical sense. The fact that it communicates our observations effectively may give us a reason to continue. It does not supply a new observational finding concerning the reality of the thing system as a whole. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, §2, “The world of things”
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